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Torture,	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Gabriella	  Silvestrini	  9	  de	  mayo,	  18:30h,	  aula	  23	  	  	  
1.	  Torture,	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  	  Georg	  Simmel,	  The	  Phenomenon	  of	  Outvoting,	   in	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Georg	  Simmel	  (1908),	  trans.	  by	  Kurt	  Wolff,	  London,	  Macmillan,	  1950	  	  The	  voting	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  avoiding	  the	  immediate	  contest	  of	  forces	  and	  of	  finding	  out	  its	  potential	  result	  by	   counting	   votes,	   so	   that	   the	  minority	  may	   convince	   itself	   that	   its	   actual	   resistance	  would	  be	  of	   no	   avail	   […]	  Voting	   has	   the	   same	  methodological	   function	   here	   as	   have,	   between	   parties,	   diplomatic	   or	   other	   negotiations	  designed	  to	  avoid	  the	  ultima	  ratio	  of	  fight.	  	  	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948).	  	  Art.	  5:	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment.	  	  
European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1950)	  	  Art.	  3:	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment.	  	  
Convention	  against	  Torture	  and	  Other	  Cruel,	   Inhman	  or	  Degrading	  Treatement	  or	  Punishment	  (1984)	  	  The	  States	  Parties	  to	  this	  Convention,	  	  Considering	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  proclaimed	  in	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  recognition	  of	  the	  equal	  and	  inalienable	  rights	  of	  all	  members	  of	  the	  human	  family	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  freedom,	  justice	  and	  peace	  in	  the	  world,	  	  Recognizing	  that	  those	  rights	  derive	  from	  the	  inherent	  dignity	  of	  the	  human	  person,	  	  Considering	  the	  obligation	  of	  States	  under	  the	  Charter,	  in	  particular	  Article	  55,	  to	  promote	  universal	  respect	  for,	  and	  observance	  of,	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms,	  	  Having	   regard	   to	   article	   5	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   article	   7	   of	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  both	  of	  which	  provide	  that	  no	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment,	  	  Having	  regard	  also	  to	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  All	  Persons	  from	  Being	  Subjected	  to	  Torture	  and	  Other	  Cruel,	  Inhuman	  or	  Degrading	  Treatment	  or	  Punishment,	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  9	  December	  1975,	  	  Desiring	  to	  make	  more	  effective	  the	  struggle	  against	  torture	  and	  other	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment	  throughout	  the	  world,	  	  Have	  agreed	  as	  follows:	  	  
PART	  I	  	  
	  
Article	  1	  	  	  
2	  	  
1.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   Convention,	   the	   term	   “torture”	  means	   any	   act	   by	  which	   severe	   pain	   or	   suffering,	  whether	  physical	  or	  mental,	   is	  intentionally	  inflicted	  on	  a	  person	  for	  such	  purposes	  as	  obtaining	  from	  him	  or	  a	  third	   person	   information	   or	   a	   confession,	   punishing	   him	   for	   an	   act	   he	   or	   a	   third	   person	   has	   committed	   or	   is	  suspected	  of	  having	  committed,	  or	   intimidating	  or	  coercing	  him	  or	  a	   third	  person,	  or	   for	  any	  reason	  based	  on	  discrimination	  of	  any	  kind,	  when	  such	  pain	  or	  suffering	  is	  inflicted	  by	  or	  at	  the	  instigation	  of	  or	  with	  the	  consent	  or	   acquiescence	   of	   a	   public	   official	   or	   other	   person	   acting	   in	   an	   official	   capacity.	   It	   does	   not	   include	   pain	   or	  suffering	  arising	  only	  from,	  inherent	  in	  or	  incidental	  to	  lawful	  sanctions.	  	  2.	   This	   article	   is	  without	   prejudice	   to	   any	   international	   instrument	   or	   national	   legislation	  which	   does	   or	  may	  contain	  provisions	  of	  wider	  application.	  	  	  
Article	  2	  	  	  1.	  Each	  State	  Party	  shall	   take	  effective	   legislative,	  administrative,	   judicial	  or	  other	  measures	   to	  prevent	  acts	  of	  torture	  in	  any	  territory	  under	  its	  jurisdiction.	  	  2.	   No	   exceptional	   circumstances	   whatsoever,	   whether	   a	   state	   of	   war	   or	   a	   threat	   of	   war,	   internal	   political	  instability	  or	  any	  other	  public	  emergency,	  may	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  torture.	  	  3.	  An	  order	  from	  a	  superior	  officer	  or	  a	  public	  authority	  may	  not	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  torture.	  	  	  
Torture	  coming	  back?	  The	  “ticking	  bomb	  argument”	  and	  the	  “torture	  warrant”	  	  Alan	  Dershowitz,	   «Is	  There	   a	  Torturous	  Road	   to	   Justice?»	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	   November	  08,	  2001	  	  If	  a	  suspect	  is	  given	  “use	  immunity”	  -­‐	  a	  judicial	  decree	  announcing	  in	  advance	  that	  nothing	  the	  defendant	  says	  (or	  its	  fruits)	  can	  be	  used	  against	  him	  in	  a	  criminal	  case	  -­‐	  he	  can	  be	  compelled	  to	  answer	  all	  proper	  questions.	  The	  issue	  then	  becomes	  what	  sorts	  of	  pressures	  can	  constitutionally	  be	  used	  to	  implement	  that	  compulsion.	  We	  know	  that	  he	  can	  be	  imprisoned	  until	  he	  talks.	  But	  what	  if	  imprisonment	  is	  insufficient	  to	  compel	  him	  to	  do	  what	  he	  has	  a	  legal	  obligation	  to	  do?	  Can	  other	  techniques	  of	  compulsion	  be	  attempted?	  […]	  What	  if	  the	  truth	  serum	  doesn't	  work?	  Could	  the	  judge	  issue	  a	  "torture	  warrant,"	  authorizing	  the	  FBI	  to	  employ	  specified	  forms	  of	  non-­‐lethal	  physical	  pressure	  to	  compel	  the	  immunized	  suspect	  to	  talk?	  Here	  we	  run	   into	  another	  provision	  of	   the	  Constitution	   -­‐	   the	  due	  process	  clause,	  which	  may	   include	  a	  general	  "shock	  the	  conscience"	  test.	  And	  torture	  in	  general	  certainly	  shocks	  the	  conscience	  of	  most	  civilized	  nations.	  But	  what	   if	   it	  were	   limited	   to	   the	   rare	   "ticking	   bomb"	   case	   -­‐	   the	   situation	   in	  which	   a	   captured	   terrorist	  who	  knows	  of	  an	  imminent	  large-­‐scale	  threat	  refuses	  to	  disclose	  it?	  Would	  torturing	  one	  guilty	  terrorist	  to	  prevent	  the	  deaths	  of	  a	  thousand	  innocent	  civilians	  shock	  the	  conscience	  of	  all	  decent	  people?	  To	  prove	  that	  it	  would	  not,	  consider	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  kidnapped	  child	  had	  been	  buried	  in	  a	  box	  with	  two	  hours	  of	  oxygen.	  The	  kidnapper	  refuses	  to	  disclose	  its	  location.	  Should	  we	  not	  consider	  torture	  in	  that	  situation?	  All	  of	  that	  said,	  the	  argument	  for	  allowing	  torture	  as	  an	  approved	  technique,	  even	  in	  a	  narrowly	  specified	  range	  of	  cases,	  is	  very	  troubling.	  We	   know	   from	   experience	   that	   law	   enforcement	   personnel	   who	   are	   given	   limited	   authority	   to	   torture	   will	  expand	   its	   use.	   The	   cases	   that	   have	   generated	   the	   current	   debate	   over	   torture	   illustrate	   this	   problem.	   And,	  concerning	  the	  arrests	  made	  following	  the	  Sept.	  11	  attacks,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  detainees	  know	  about	  specific	  future	  terrorist	  targets.	  Yet	  there	  have	  been	  calls	  to	  torture	  these	  detainees.	  I	  have	  no	  doubt	   that	   if	   an	  actual	   ticking	  bomb	  situation	  were	   to	  arise,	  our	   law	  enforcement	  authorities	  would	  torture.	  The	  real	  debate	  is	  whether	  such	  torture	  should	  take	  place	  outside	  of	  our	  legal	  system	  or	  within	  it.	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  seems	  clear:	  If	  we	  are	  to	  have	  torture,	  it	  should	  be	  authorized	  by	  the	  law.	  Judges	   should	   have	   to	   issue	   a	   "torture	  warrant"	   in	   each	   case.	   Thus	  we	  would	   not	   be	  winking	   an	   eye	   of	   quiet	  approval	  at	  torture	  while	  publicly	  condemning	  it.	  Democracy	   requires	   accountability	   and	   transparency,	   especially	   when	   extraordinary	   steps	   are	   taken.	   Most	  important,	  it	  requires	  compliance	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  And	  such	  compliance	  is	  impossible	  when	  an	  extraordinary	  technique,	  such	  as	  torture,	  operates	  outside	  of	  the	  law.	  	  	  
3	  	  
	  	  	  	  
Arguments	  against	  torture	  	  Cesare	  Beccaria,	  Of	  Crimes	  and	  Punishments	  (1764),	  chap.	  XVI,	  Of	  Torture,	  London,	  1801	  	  	  The	  torture	  of	  a	  criminal	  during	  the	  course	  of	  his	  trial	   is	  a	  cruelty	  consecrated	  by	  custom	  in	  most	  nations.	  It	   is	  used	  with	  an	  intent	  either	  to	  make	  him	  confess	  his	  crime,	  or	  to	  explain	  some	  contradictions	  into	  which	  he	  had	  been	   led	   during	   his	   examination,	   or	   discover	   his	   accomplices,	   or	   for	   some	   kind	   of	   metaphysical	   and	  incomprehensible	  purgation	  of	  infamy,	  or,	  finally,	   in	  order	  to	  discover	  other	  crimes	  of	  which	  he	  is	  not	  accused,	  but	  of	  which	  he	  may	  be	  guilty.	  No	  man	  can	  be	   judged	  a	  criminal	  until	  he	  be	   found	  guilty;	  nor	  can	  society	  take	  from	  him	  the	  public	  protection	  until	  it	  have	  been	  proved	  that	  he	  has	  violated	  the	  conditions	  on	  which	  it	  was	  granted.	  What	  right,	  then,	  but	  that	  of	  power,	  can	  authorise	  the	  punishment	  of	  a	  citizen	  so	  long	  as	  there	  remains	  any	  doubt	  of	  his	  guilt?	  This	  dilemma	  is	  frequent.	  Either	  he	  is	  guilty,	  or	  not	  guilty.	  If	  guilty,	  he	  should	  only	  suffer	  the	  punishment	  ordained	  by	  the	  laws,	  and	  torture	  becomes	  useless,	  as	  his	  confession	  is	  unnecessary,	  if	  he	  be	  not	  guilty,	  you	  torture	  the	  innocent;	  for,	  in	  the	   eye	   of	   the	   law,	   every	   man	   is	   innocent	   whose	   crime	   has	   not	   been	   proved.	   Besides,	   it	   is	   confounding	   all	  relations	  to	  expect	  that	  a	  man	  should	  be	  both	  the	  accuser	  and	  accused;	  and	  that	  pain	  should	  be	  the	  test	  of	  truth,	  as	  if	  truth	  resided	  in	  the	  muscles	  and	  fibres	  of	  a	  wretch	  in	  torture.	  By	  this	  method	  the	  robust	  will	  escape,	  and	  the	  feeble	  be	  condemned.	  These	  are	  the	  inconveniences	  of	  this	  pretended	  test	  of	  truth,	  worthy	  only	  of	  a	  cannibal,	  and	  which	  the	  Romans,	  in	  many	  respects	  barbarous,	  and	  whose	  savage	  virtue	  has	  been	  too	  much	  admired,	  reserved	  for	  the	  slaves	  alone.	  […]	  What	   is	   the	   political	   intention	   of	   punishments?	   To	   terrify	   and	   be	   an	   example	   to	   others.	   Is	   this	   intention	  answered	  by	   thus	  privately	   torturing	   the	   guilty	   and	   the	   innocent?	   It	   is	  doubtless	  of	   importance	   that	  no	   crime	  should	  remain	  unpunished;	  but	  it	  is	  useless	  to	  make	  a	  public	  example	  of	  the	  author	  of	  a	  crime	  hid	  in	  darkness.	  A	  crime	  already	  committed,	  and	  for	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  remedy,	  can	  only	  be	  punished	  by	  a	  political	  society	  with	  an	  intention	  that	  no	  hopes	  of	  impunity	  should	  induce	  others	  to	  commit	  the	  same.	  If	  it	  be	  true,	  that	  the	  number	  of	  those	  who	   from	  fear	  or	  virtue	  respect	   the	   laws	   is	  greater	   than	  of	   those	  by	  whom	  they	  are	  violated,	   the	  risk	  of	  torturing	  an	  innocent	  person	  is	  greater,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  probability	  that,	  cæteris	  paribus,	  an	  individual	  hath	  observed,	  than	  that	  he	  hath	  infringed	  the	  laws.	  […]	  The	  impression	  of	  pain,	  then,	  may	  increase	  to	  such	  a	  degree,	  that,	  occupying	  the	  mind	  entirely,	  it	  will	  compel	  the	  sufferer	  to	  use	  the	  shortest	  method	  of	  freeing	  himself	  from	  torment.	  His	  answer,	  therefore,	  will	  be	  an	  effect	  as	  necessary	  as	  that	  of	  fire	  or	  boiling	  water,	  and	  he	  will	  accuse	  himself	  of	  crimes	  of	  which	  he	  is	  innocent:	  so	  that	  the	  very	  means	  employed	  to	  distinguish	  the	  innocent	  from	  the	  guilty	  will	  most	  effectually	  destroy	  all	  difference	  between	  them.	  […]	   The	   examination	   of	   the	   accused	   is	   intended	   to	   find	   out	   the	   truth;	   but	   if	   this	   be	   discovered	  with	   so	  much	  difficulty	  in	  the	  air,	  gesture,	  and	  countenance	  of	  a	  man	  at	  case,	  how	  can	  it	  appear	  in	  a	  countenance	  distorted	  by	  the	  convulsions	  of	  torture?	  Every	  violent	  action	  destroys	  those	  small	  alterations	  in	  the	  features	  which	  sometimes	  disclose	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  heart.	  […]	  A	  very	  strange	  but	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  torture	  is,	  that	  the	  case	  of	  the	  innocent	  is	  worse	  than	  that	   of	   the	   guilty.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   first,	   either	   he	   confesses	   the	   crime	  which	   he	   has	   not	   committed,	   and	   is	  condemned,	  or	  he	  is	  acquitted,	  and	  has	  suffered	  a	  punishment	  he	  did	  not	  deserve.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  person	  who	  is	  really	  guilty	  has	  the	  most	  favourable	  side	  of	  the	  question;	  for,	  if	  he	  supports	  the	  torture	  with	  firmness	  and	  resolution,	  he	  is	  acquitted,	  and	  has	  gained,	  having	  exchanged	  a	  greater	  punishment	  for	  a	  less.	  	  	  Jean	  Améry,	  Torture,	  in	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits.	  Contemplations	  by	  a	  survivor	  on	  Auschwitz	  and	  its	  
realities	  (1966),	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1980	  	  In	  most	  Western	   countries	   torture	  was	   eliminated	   as	   an	   institution	   and	  method	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   eighteenth	  century.	  And	  yet,	  today,	  two	  hundred	  years	  later,	  there	  are	  still	  men	  and	  women	  -­‐	  no	  one	  knows	  how	  many-­‐who	  can	   tell	   of	   the	   torture	   they	   underwent.	   As	   I	   am	   preparing	   this	   article,	   I	   come	   across	   a	   newspaper	   page	  with	  photos	  that	  show	  members	  of	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  army	  torturing	  captured	  Vietcong	  rebels.	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[…]	  It	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   something	   as	   extreme	   as	   torture.	   Arrest	   is	   enough	   and,	   if	   need	   be,	   the	   first	   blow	   one	  receives.	   “If	   you	   talk,”	   the	  men	  with	   the	  plain,	   ordinary	   faces	   said	   to	  me,	   “then	  you	  will	   be	  put	   in	   the	  military	  police	   prison.	   If	   you	  don't	   confess,	   then	   it's	   off	   to	  Breendonk,	   and	   you	   know	  what	   that	  means”.	   I	   knew,	   and	   I	  didn't	  know.	  In	  any	  case,	  I	  acted	  roughly	  like	  the	  man	  who	  buys	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  spoke	  as	  planned.	  I	  would	  be	  most	  pleased	  to	  avoid	  Breendonk,	  with	  which	  I	  was	  quite	  familiar,	  and	  give	  the	  evidence	  desired	  of	  me.	  Except	  that	   I	   unfortunately	   knew	   nothing,	   or	   almost	   nothing.	   Accomplices?	   I	   could	   name	   only	   their	   aliases.	   Hiding	  places?	  But	  one	  was	   led	   to	   them	  only	  at	  night,	   and	   the	  exact	  addresses	  were	  never	  entrusted	   to	  us.	  For	   these	  men,	   however,	   that	   was	   far	   too	   familiar	   twaddle,	   and	   it	   didn't	   pay	   them'to	   go	   into	   it.	   They	   laughed	  contemptuously.	  And	  suddenly	  I	  felt-­‐the	  first	  blow.	  In	  an	  interrogation,	  blows	  have	  only	  scant	  criminological	  significance.	  They	  are	  tacitly	  practiced	  and	  accepted,	  a	  normal	  measure	  employedagainst	  recalcitrant	  prisoners	  who	  are	  unwilling	  to	  confess.	  […]	  Mostly,	  the	  public	  does	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  finicky	  when	  such	  occurrences	  in	  police	  stations	  are	  revealed	  now	  and	  then	  in	  the	  press.	  At	  best,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  interpellation	  in	  Parliament	  by	  some	  leftist-­‐oriented	  deputy.	  But	  then	  the	   stories	   fizzle	   out;	   I	   have	   never	   yet	   heard	   of	   a	   police	   official	   who	   had	   beaten	   a	   prisoner	   and	   was	   not	  energetically	   covered	   by	   his	   superior	   officers.	   Simple	   blows,	  which	   really	   are	   entirely	   incommensurable	  with	  actual	   torture,	  may	  almost	  never	   create	   a	   far-­‐reaching	  echo	  among	   the	  public,	   but	   for	   the	  person	  who	   suffers	  them	   they	   are	   still	   experiences	   that	   leave	   deep	  marks-­‐if	   one	   wishes	   not	   to	   use	   up	   the	   high-­‐sounding	   words	  already	  and	  clearly	  say:	  enormities.	  The	   first	  blow	  brings	  home	  to	   the	  prisoner	   that	  he	   is	  helpless,	  and	   thus	   it	  already	  contains	  in	  the	  bud	  everything	  that	  is	  to	  come.	  One	  may	  have	  known	  about	  torture	  and	  death	  in	  the	  cell,	  without	   such	  knowledge	  having	  possessed	   the	  hue	  of	   life;	  but	  upon	   the	   first	  blow	   they	  are	  anticipated	  as	   real	  possibilities,	  yes,	  as	  certainties.	  They	  are	  permitted	  to	  punch	  me	  in	  the	  face,	  the	  victim	  feels	  in	  numb	  surprise	  and	  concludes	  in	  just	  as	  numb	  certainty:	  they	  will	  do	  with	  me	  what	  they	  want.	  Whoever	  would	  rush	  to	  the	  prisoner's	  aid-­‐a	  wife,	  a	  mother,	  a	  brother,	  or	  friend-­‐he	  won't	  get	  this	  far.	  Not	  much	  is	  said	  when	  someone	  who	  has	  never	  been	  beaten	  makes	  the	  ethical	  and	  pathetic	  statement	  that	  upon	  the	  first	  blow	  the	  prisoner	  loses	  his	  human	  dignity.	  I	  must	  confess	  that	  I	  don't	  know	  exactly	  what	  that	  is:	  human	  dignity.	  One	  person	  thinks	  he	  loses	  it	  when	  he	  finds	  himself	  in	  circumstances	  that	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	  take	   a	   daily	   bath.	   Another	   believes	   he	   loses	   it	  when	   he	  must	   speak	   to	   an	   official	   in	   something	   other	   than	   his	  native	   language.	   In	  one	   instance	  human	  dignity	   is	  bound	  to	  a	  certain	  physical	  convenience,	   in	   the	  other	   to	   the	  right	  of	  free	  speech,	  in	  still	  another	  perhaps	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  erotic	  partners	  of	  the	  same	  sex.	  I	  don't	  know	  if	  the	  person	  who	  is	  beaten	  by	  the	  police	   loses	  human	  dignity.	  Yet	  I	  am	  certain	  that	  with	  the	  very	  first	  blow	  that	  descends	  on	  him	  he	   loses	   something	  we	  will	  perhaps	   temporarily	   call	   “trust	   in	   the	  world.”	  Trust	   in	   the	  world	  includes	  all	  sorts	  of	   things:	   the	   irrational	  and	   logically	  unjustifiable	  belief	   in	  absolute	  causality	  perhaps,	  or	   the	  likewise	  blind	  belief	  in	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  inductive	  inference.	  But	  more	  important	  as	  an	  element	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  in	  our	  context	  what	   is	  solely	  relevant,	   is	   the	  certainty	  that	  by	  reason	  of	  written	  or	  unwritten	  social	  contracts	  the	  other	  person	  will	  spare	  me-­‐more	  precisely	  stated,	  that	  he	  will	  respect	  my	  physical,	  and	  with	  it	  also	  my	  metaphysical,	  being.	  The	  boundaries	  of	  my	  body	  are	  also	  the	  boundaries	  of	  my	  self.	  My	  skin	  surface	  shields	  me	  against	  the	  external	  world.	  If	  	  I	  am	  to	  have	  trust,	  I	  must	  feel	  on	  it	  only	  what	  I	  want	  	  to	  feel.	  At	   the	   first	   blow,	   however,	   this	   trust	   in	   the	   world	   breaks	   down.	   The	   other	   person,	   opposite	   	   whom	   I	   exist	  physically	  in	  the	  world	  and	  with	  whom	  I	  can	  exist	  only	  as	  long	  as	  he	  does	  not	  touch	  my	  skin	  surface	  as	  border,	  forces	  his	  own	  corporeality	  on	  me	  with	  the	  first	  blow.	  He	  is	  on	  me	  and	  thereby	  destroys	  me.	  It	  	  is	  like	  a	  rape,	  a	  sexual	   act	   without	   the	   consent	   of	   one	   of	   the	   two	   partners.	   Certainly,	   if	   there	   is	   even	   a	   minimal	   prospect	   of	  successful	  resistance,	  a	  mechanism	  is	  set	  in	  motion	  that	  enables	  me	  to	  rectify	  the	  border	  violation	  by	  the	  other	  person.	  For	  my	  part,	  I	  can	  expand	  in	  urgent	  self-­‐defense,	  objectify	  my	  own	  corporeality,	  restore	  the	  trust	  in	  my	  continued	  existence.	  The	  social	  contract	  then	  has	  another	  text	  and	  other	  clauses:	  an	  eye	  for	  an	  eye	  and	  a	  tooth	  for	  a	  tooth.	  You	  can	  also	  regulate	  your	  life	  according	  to	  that.	  You	  cannot	  	  do	  it	  when	  it	  is	  the	  other	  one	  who	  knocks	  out	  the	  tooth,	  sinks	  the	  eye	  into	  a	  swollen	  mass,	  and	  you	  yourself	  suffer	  on	  your	  body	  the	  counter-­‐man	  that	  your	  fellow	   man	   became.	   If	   	   no	   help	   can	   be	   expected,	   this	   physical	   overwhelming	   by	   the	   other	   then	   becomes	   an	  existential	  consummation	  of	  destruction	  altogether.	  The	  expectation	  of	  help,	  the	  certainty	  of	  help,	  is	  indeed	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  experiences	  of	  human	  beings,	  and	  probably	  also	  of	  animals.	  […]	  In	   almost	   all	   situations	   in	   life	  where	   there	   is	   bodily	   injury	   there	   is	   also	   the	   expectation	  of	   help;	   the	   former	   is	  compensated	  by	  the	  latter.	  But	  with	  the	  first	  blow	  from	  a	  policeman's	  fist,	  against	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  defense	  and	  which	  no	  helping	  hand	  will	  ward	  off,	  a	  part	  of	  our	  life	  ends	  and	  it	  can	  never	  again	  be	  revived.	  […]	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During	   these	   few	   minutes,	   when	   you	   are	   already	   expending	   your	   utmost	   strength,	   when	   sweat	   has	   already	  appeared	   on	   your	   forehead	   and	   lips,	   and	   you	   are	   breathing	   in	   gasps,	   you	   will	   not	   answer	   any	   questions.	  Accomplices?	  Addresses?	  Meeting	  places?	  You	  hardly	  hear	  it.	  All	   your	   life	   is	   gathered	   in	   a	   single,	   limited	   area	   of	   the	   body,	   the	   shoulder	   joints,	   and	   it	   does	   not	   react;	   for	   it	  exhausts	  itself	  completely	  in	  the	  expenditure	  of	  energy.	  But	  this	  cannot	  last	  long,	  even	  with	  people	  who	  have	  a	  strong	   physical	   constitution.	   As	   for	   me,	   I	   had	   to	   give	   up	   rather	   quickly.	   And	   now	   there	   was	   a	   crackling	   and	  splintering	  in	  my	  shoulders	  that	  my	  body	  has	  not	  forgotten	  until	  this	  hour.	  The	  balls	  sprang	  from	  their	  sockets.	  My	  own	  body	  weight	  caused	  luxation;	  I	  fell	  into	  a	  void	  and	  now	  hung	  by	  my	  dislocated	  anns,	  which	  had	  been	  torn	  high	  from	  behind	  and	  were	  now	  twisted	  over	  my	  head.	  Torture,	  from	  Latin	  torquere,	  	  to	  twist.	  […]	  In	  this	  way,	  torture	  becomes	  the	  total	   inversione	  of	  the	  social	  world,	   in	  which	  we	  can	  live	  only	   if	  we	  grant	  out	  fellow	  man	  life,	  ease	  his	  suffering,	  bridle	  the	  desire	  of	  our	  ego	  to	  expand.	  But	  in	  the	  world	  of	  torture	  man	  exists	  only	  by	  ruining	  the	  other	  person	  who	  stands	  before	  him.	  A	  slight	  pressure	  by	  the	  tool-­‐wielding	  hand	  is	  enough	  to	  turn	  the	  other	  –	  along	  his	  head,	   in	  which	  are	  perhaps	  stored	  Kant	  and	  Hegel,	  and	  all	  nine	  symphonies,	  and	  the	  World	   as	  Will	   and	   Representation	   –	   into	   a	   shrilly	   squilly	   piglet	   at	   slaughter.	  When	   it	   has	   happened	   and	   the	  torturer	  has	  expanded	  into	  the	  body	  of	  his	  fellow	  man	  and	  extinguished	  what	  was	  his	  spirit,	  he	  himself	  can	  then	  smoke	   a	   cigarette	   or	   sit	   down	   to	   breakfast	   or,	   if	   he	   has	   the	   desire,	   have	   a	   look	   in	   at	   the	  World	   as	  Will	   and	  Representation.	  […]	  Whoever	  has	  succumbed	  to	  torture	  can	  no	  longer	  feel	  at	  home	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  shame	  of	  destruction	  cannot	  be	  erased.	  Trust	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  already	  collapsed	  in	  part	  at	  the	  first	  blow,	  but	  in	  the	  end,	  under	  torture,	  fully,	  will	  not	  be	  regained.	  That	  one's	  fellow	  man	  was	  experienced	  as	  the	  antiman	  remains	  in	  the	  tortured	  person	  as	  accumulated	  horror.	  It	  blocks	   the	   view	   into	   a	   world	   in	   which	   the	   principle	   of	   hope	   rules.	   One	   who	   was	   martyred	   is	   a	   defenseless	  prisoner	   of	   fear.	   It	   is	   fear	   that	   henceforth	   reigns	   over	   him.	   Fear-­‐and	   also	   what	   is	   called	   resentments.	   They	  remain,	  and	  have	  scarcely	  a	  chance	  to	  concentrate	  into	  a	  seething,	  punfying	  thirst	  for	  revenge.	  	  
